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When playing games in groups, it is an advantage for individuals to have accurate statistical
information on the strategies of their opponents. Such information may be obtained by remembering
previous interactions. We consider a rock-scissors-paper game in which agents are able to recall their
last m interactions, used to estimate the behaviour of their opponents. At critical memory length,
a Hopf bifurcation leads to the formation of stable limit cycles. In a mixed population, agents
with longer memories have an advantage, provided the system has a stable xed point, and there is
some asymmetry in the payos of the pure strategies. However, at a critical concentration of long
memory agents, the appearance of limit cycles destroys their advantage. By introducing population
dynamics that favours successful agents, we show that the system evolves toward the bifurcation
point.
PACS numbers: 02.50.Le,05.10.Ln
I. INTRODUCTION
\The wise can learn from their enemies" [1], but the
methods by which they do this are not fully understood.
The mathematical analysis of competitions between op-
ponents, called \the theory of games", began with von
Neumann [2] and Nash [3]. This early work concerned the
equilibria of games, where no agent has anything to gain
by changing strategy [4]. The question of if, and how,
game players reach an equilibrium has been the subject
of a great deal of work since. The dynamics of games
can have dierent driving mechanisms. In \evolution-
ary game theory" [5], devised by John Maynard Smith in
1973, agents (living organisms) whose strategies are ef-
fective against competitors survive and reproduce more
rapidly. This replicates their genes, and strategies they
encode, in higher concentration in future generations.
The \replicator equations" which describe this process
have applications in diverse scientic settings from the
evolution of language [6] to behavioural dynamics and
decision making [7]. Alternatively, death and reproduc-
tion need not be involved if agents are able to learn from
experience. An early example of such a learning rule
is \ctitious play" [8] where players believe that their
opponents are choosing strategies at random from a sta-
tionary distribution. They build a progressively clearer
picture of this ctitious distribution through repeated in-
teractions and at each round play the best response. The
rule has an obvious aw in that the real distribution is
non-stationary. An alternative, derived from psychology,
is reinforcement learning [9] of which an example is \ex-
perience weighted attraction" [10]. Here, actions that
have proved successful in the past are played more fre-
quently. In the context of cyclic competition, this can
give rise to a wide range of competitive and cooperative
behaviours, including quasiperiodicity, limit cycles, inter-
mittency and chaos [11]. If agents learn by sampling a
nite number of their opponents' moves between strat-
egy updates, the noise inherent in these samples has been
shown [12] to lead to noise-sustained cycling or removal
of periodic orbits present in the limit of innite sample
size. The processes of sampling in between strategy up-
dates is referred to as \batch learning".
In this paper we introduce learning dynamics in which
agents possess a simple form of nite memory for their
previous interactions. They use this memory as a statis-
tical sample to predict the current best pure strategy, ad-
justing their probabilistic strategy after each new inter-
action. This constant updating is known as \online learn-
ing" and is central to the eects we uncover. We use our
learning rule to investigate the children's game of rock-
scissors-paper where rock blunts scissors, scissors cut pa-
per, and paper wraps rock. The three strategies cyclically
dominate each other [13], a situation which can arise in
nature [14], and in sociological contexts [15]. When the
rock-scissors-paper game is studied using replicator dy-
namics, according to which the relative abundance of a
strategy changes at a rate proportional to the dierence
between its expected payo (its tness) and the average
for the population, then stable limit cycles do not appear.
Depending on the values of payos for winning or losing,
the system exhibits one of three kinds of behaviour: sta-
ble coexistence, neutrally stable cycles, or cycles of in-
creasing amplitude [16]. The rst result we present is to
show that in our memory based learning dynamics, limit
cycles can form at critical memory length. The origin
of this eect is the fact that agents' memories are not
a sample of the current system state, and so agents are
responding to \delayed" information. We derive a de-
lay equation [17] to describe the dynamics of our system,
from which the critical memory length can be determined
by analysing the Hopf bifurcation which creates the limit
cycles. The formation of limit cycles in games, driven
by time delay, has been studied by a number of authors
[18{21], and in particular the rock scissors paper game
has received recent attention [20]. These studies analyse
replicator dynamics when populations respond to payos
from a time t  T where t is the present time and T > 0
is a xed delay interval. In contrast to replicator dynam-
ics, our agents use their nite size memory, containing an
2inherently noisy record of the state of the system over a
period of time (rather than at a single instant), to adjust
their strategies toward the one which currently appears
optimal. This sample based learning dynamics leads to
our second main result: that a dynamical equilibrium be-
tween memory lengths can evolve due to the competition
between the statistical advantages of having a long mem-
ory (a large sample), and the disadvantage of creating
limit cycles which can be exploited by faster responding
players. Stochastic eects arising from nite population
sizes and dierent matching mechanisms [22] in combi-
nation with delays [23] have been studied previously, but
our study of memory length and its advantages in this
context is, we believe, new. Furthermore, the eects we
report here may be observed more generally. For exam-
ple, we have found similar eects in a thermal urn model
of \exploitative competition" for stochastic yields [24].
The neurological mechanisms by which humans and
animals remember information are not completely un-
derstood [25], but it is clear that there are multiple types
of memory, and memory systems [26]. Broadly speaking,
memories fall into two classes: they are either explicit
recollections of events or facts - \declarative" memories
- or learned motor or social skills and social condition-
ing [25]. The nite declarative memory for interactions
with which our agents are endowed is deliberately sim-
ple, but our analysis could be repeated with other models
of memory, or an empirical \forgetting curve" [27] which
describes how memory decays with time.
II. MODEL DEFINITION
We study the zero sum rock-scissors-paper game, with
payo matrix
0@
R S P
R 0   
S   0 
P    0
1A: (1)
The game is played in continuous time by L  2 agents
who interact using random pairings which occur at rate
L=2 per unit time so that each agent experiences, on
average, one interaction per unit time. Formally, the
probability that a single pairing takes place in time t is
Lt=2+o(t). Agents each adopt a probabilistic strategy
which, for agent i 2 f1; : : :  Lg, after the nth interaction is
written [ri; si]n, where ri; si and 1 ri si are the proba-
bilities of playing, respectively, rock, scissors or paper at
the next interaction. Each agent is able to recall his last
m interactions, producing a sample from the population
of strategies fR;Sg where R and S are the numbers of
rock and scissors interactions in his memory. Note that
at any given time, both samples fR;Sg and strategies
[ri; si]n require only two parameters for their description.
Agents estimate the current average probability
weights of their opponents as the fractions in their cur-
rent sample, and use this to discern the optimal strategy.
Rock
Scissors
Paper
Βm
Α + Β + Γ
HΒ + ΓLm
Α + Β + Γ
m
Α + Β + Γ
HΒ + ΓLm
Α + Β + Γ
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S
FIG. 1. Domains in which each of the three strategies are
assessed to be the best.
From the form of the payo matrix (1), we see that the
optimal strategy is determined by which of the following
domains the current sample lies
DR :=

S >
m
+  + 
;R >
( + )m
+  + 
  S

(2)
DS :=

R <
m
+  + 
;R <
( + )m
+  + 
  S

(3)
DP :=

R >
m
+  + 
; S <
m
+  + 

: (4)
These domains are illustrated in Figure 1. At each point
in time, each agent's memory denes the position of a
random walker in the simplex f(R;S)jR+ S  mg, with
each new interaction determining the next step of the
walk. After each step an agent will update his strategy
according to the domain in which its memory lies, using
the following rule
[ri; si]n+1 = (1  )[ri; si]n + 
8><>:
[1; 0] if (R;S) 2 DR
[0; 1] if (R;S) 2 DS
[0; 0] if (R;S) 2 DP :
(5)
For certain combinations of payos and memory length,
(R;S) can lie on the boundary between two domains, in
which case no update is made. The parameter  2 [0; 1],
the \update rate", describes the sensitivity of agents to
new information, and n indexes the number of inter-
actions. According to denition (5), the current strat-
egy is an exponential moving average of the strategies
which were estimated to be optimal from past interac-
tions. Our learning rule has some commonality with ex-
perience weighted attraction rules used in recent studies
[10, 12] where a parameter analogous with our  is used
to describe how rapidly agents respond to new informa-
tion. In these studies, the parameter is interpreted as a
measure of memory in the learning process, because it
determines how much weight is given to previous infor-
mation. Using this interpretation, our model may be seen
30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
Εt
r,
s,
p
FIG. 2. Probability weights of rock (open circles), scissors
(dots) and paper (squares) agents in a group of size L = 100
with  = 2;  =  = 1. All agents have memory m = 100
and update rate  = 5  10 4. Dashed lines show solutions
to delay equations (16) and (17) using the same parameter
values.
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FIG. 3. Probability weights of rock (open circles), scissors
(dots) and paper (squares) agents in a group of size L = 100
with  = 2;  =  = 1. All agents have memory m = 100 and
update rate  = 10 3. Dashed lines show solutions to delay
equations (16) and (17) using the same parameter values.
as containing two kinds of memory: an \active" memory -
the recent sample - used for decision making, and a \pas-
sive" memory which equally weights all previous samples
in the limit  ! 0 and only uses the most recent when
 = 1. We note also that our rule, in common with c-
titious play [8], implicitly assumes that agent's samples
are drawn from a stationary distribution.
III. SIMULATION RESULTS
A. Single memory length
We begin by considering the behaviour of a population
of agents, all of whom have the same memory length and
update rate. In order to explore the dynamics of the
population, we observe the average probability weights
associated with each strategy. For example, the weight
associated with rock is
r(t) :=
1
L
LX
i=1
ri(t) (6)
with s(t) and p(t) dened similarly. The evolution of
the total probability weights in a population with up-
date rate  = 5  10 4 and memory m = 100 is shown
in Figure 2. Initial oscillations decay, eventually leaving
the system in a stable state. The strategies of individ-
uals in the population track the curves in Figure 2, but
with a greater stochastic component. In Figure 3 we have
increased the rate to  = 10 3, and we see that stable os-
cillations have formed. For given memory length, these
appear when the update rate is suciently large. Con-
versely, for given update rate, stable oscillations emerge
when the memory length is suciently large. We will
show later that it is the product m2 which must exceed
a critical value for stable oscillations to appear. This
transition from stable equilibrium to stable oscillations
at critical parameter values is known as a \Hopf Bifur-
cation" [17].
B. Agents as statisticians
The memory of each agent represents a sample from a
time varying population, which is used to estimate the
current strategy fractions. We will demonstrate later
that it is the use of this delayed information which desta-
bilizes the xed point. Because the primitive estimation
method has a role to play in creating this instability we
compare it to an alternative method: \logistic regres-
sion" [28], in order to determine its plausibility as the
choice of an intelligent agent, assuming he can recall the
times at which the interactions in his sample took place.
To apply logistic regression, we suppose that during the
period of time covered by the agent's memory, the rock
probability weight may be expressed as a logistic function
r(t) =
1
1 + e (0+1t)
(7)
where 0 and 1 are constants. It is straightforward to
carry out higher order regression where the exponent in
the denominator is replaced with a polynomial of higher
order. However, the time period in memory will typ-
ically be signicantly shorter than the period of oscil-
lation, so that r(t) changes in an approximately linear
way whilst their samples are being collected. For ex-
ample the period of oscillation in Figure 3 is T  1375
whereas the memory length is m = 100, and the great-
est change in r(t) during a single time interval of length
100 is 0.016. The constants 0 and 1 are chosen to
maximize the \likelihood" of the agents' current memory
(see appendix A for details). In Figure 4 we see the re-
sults of this method, applied to the memory of a single
randomly chosen agent from the simulation in Figure 3.
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FIG. 4. Dashed line shows the rock weight in a group of size
L = 100 with  = 2;  =  = 1. All agents have memory
m = 100 and update rate  = 10 3. Open circles show bi-
nomial logistic regression estimates of the rock fraction made
using the memory of a single randomly selected agent at a
sequence of regularly spaced intervals. Black dots show simi-
lar estimates made by simply computing the fraction of rock
interactions in the agent's memory.
Also shown are the results of the primitive estimation
method used by our agents. The primitive method ap-
pears considerably more eective at accurately predicting
the current weights. However, a subtle phase shift may
be perceived in the agent's predictions relative to the
true values. To investigate this shift, and to compare the
two methods in greater detail we construct a ctitious se-
quence of Bernoulli random variables fXkgmk=1 with suc-
cess probability, p(k), which changes over the course of
the sequence: p(k) = p0 + (p1   p0)k=m. We then use
our two methods to nd an estimate, p^1, of the value of
p1, for a very large number of example sequences, allow-
ing us to estimate the distribution of p^1. In Figure 5 we
have constructed distributions for p^1 in case m = 100. It
is clear that logistic regression produces estimates with
higher variance, but lower bias. Whilst the primitive
method is the more ecient estimator, in the sense that
the mean squared error in its predictions is smaller, its
bias creates a systematic delay in predictions. For larger
memory values this bias will reduce, because the period
of oscillation grows faster than the memory length, so
the weights change by a smaller amount over the course
of each agent's memory.
C. Mixed memory and population dynamics
We now consider the case of a mixed population con-
taining two memory lengths, m 2 f10; 100g. We might
intuitively expect that agents with longer memories will
be at an advantage because they are able to more ac-
curately predict the optimal strategy; their estimates of
opponents' strategies are subject to smaller errors. To
investigate if this is the case we introduce some simple
population dynamics, based upon an exponential moving
FIG. 5. Given a sequence fXkgmk=1 where m = 100, of
Bernoulli random variables with changing success probabil-
ity p(k) = p0 + (p1   p0)k=m where p0 = 0:2; p1 = 0:25.
Black dots show the estimated probability density function of
the logistic regression estimator p^1, having mean 0.256 and
root mean squared error 0:07. Open circles show the esti-
mated probability distribution of the number of successes in
the sequence, serving as an alternative estimator for p1, hav-
ing mean 0.225 and root mean squared error 0.07.
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FIG. 6. Populations of m = 10 (open circles) and m = 100
(dots) agents in system of size L = 200 with update rate
 = 0:01 initially composed of 199 short memory agents and a
single long memory agent. Game parameters are  = 2;  =
 = 1 and population dynamics parameters are  =  = 10 3.
Also shown in fraction of paper agents (black line), illustrating
how the onset of oscillations coincides with stable equilibrium
between memory lengths.
average of each agent's payos. We let vik be the payo
to agent i at his kth interaction since the start of the
game, and dene his moving average, vik, as follows
vi;k+1 := (1  )vik + vi;k+1: (8)
At each pairwise interaction in the game, with proba-
bility   1, the agent with the lower average payo
is replaced with a copy of the higher scoring agent and
the total score of the pair shared equally between the
original and its copy. In this way the total payo in the
population remains at zero. In Figure 6 we show the evo-
5lution of the fractions of short and long memory agents
in such a simulation, along with the probability weight
for paper, as a signier for the presence of oscillations.
Initially we have a single long memory agent, whose de-
scendants reproduce rapidly due to their enhanced abil-
ity to determine the optimal strategy to play. However,
once these long memory agents are in sucient concen-
tration, they create a limit cycle. The presence of this
cycle gives short memory agents an advantage, because
although their samples have a higher noise, they contain
more recent data. In circumstances of rapid change, older
data becomes irrelevant, and skews the sample of the long
memory agents, leading them to make poorer choices. In
consequence the eectiveness of the two memory lengths
comes into balance. The population sizes undergo noisy
oscillations about the bifurcation point once their collec-
tive strategies begin to oscillate. This indicates that the
bifurcation point is itself a self organized state, driven by
population dynamics.
The fact that the payos of the three pure strategies
are not equal is essential in order for long memory play-
ers to have an advantage. Simulations similar to that
illustrated in Figure 6 show that as the payos ; ; 
approach equality, the long memory players do not pros-
per and the self organizing Hopf bifurcation is no longer
present. An intuitive understanding of this may be ob-
tained by considering the eect of shortening the memory
length, which causes individual agents' samples to per-
form higher variance random walks around the simplex of
Figure 1. As the variance of the walk increases, agents'
predictions of the best strategy are subject to greater
variability, driving their strategies toward the symmetric
case [ 13 ;
1
3 ]. If the game is not symmetric then a small
shift towards the symmetric strategy for short memory
players gives an advantage for longer memory players. In
the symmetric case, this advantage disappears because
the symmetric strategy is optimal.
IV. THEORY
Here we investigate the dynamics of a system of identi-
cal agents as m!1 and L!1. The results we obtain
by considering these limits provide approximations to the
behaviour of smaller groups of agents for a wide range of
memory values. In particular we study the symmetric
game, allowing us to discover the analytical conditions
for stability and the period of oscillation.
A. Individual estimates of optimal strategy
In order to construct equations which describe the dy-
namics of the strategy weights r(t); s(t); p(t), we require
expressions for the probabilities that randomly selected
agents will perceive each of the three strategies as opti-
mal. If the strategy weights are constant then the num-
bers R;S and P = m R S of strategy types in a sample
of size m will be trinomially distributed with probability
mass function
f(x; y; r; s) =
m!rxsy(1  r   s)m x y
x!y!(m  x  y)! : (9)
In reality, the weights will change while the sample is be-
ing taken, producing a sequence of non-identical trivari-
ate Bernoulli trials. We approximate this distribution
with the stationary version (9) where the parameters r
and s are replaced with averages over a typical agent's
memory. Making use of the fact that the times between
the interactions of an individual agent are exponentially
distributed with unit mean, we may show (see appendix
B 1) that the normalized density of interaction times in
an agents' memory is
 (m;u)
m!
:= gm(u); (10)
where m is his memory length and  (m;u) is the in-
complete Gamma function. The function gm(u) may be
viewed as the probability density for the time of a ran-
domly selected interaction in an agent's memory. The
density has the form of a smoothed step on [0;m] which
converges to the uniform distribution as m ! 1. The
interaction times of a typical agent are therefore approx-
imately uniformly distributed on [0;m]. The rock weight
in the population, averaged over the distribution of in-
teraction times in a typical agent's memory is therefore
rm :=
Z 1
0
gm(u)r(t  u)ds (11)
 1
m
Z m
0
r(t  u)ds as m!1; (12)
with sm dened similarly. Our approximation to the true
distribution function of the sample in each agent's mem-
ory is then f(x; y; rm; sm).
We dene ~p![r; s] to be the probability that the strat-
egy ! 2 fR(ock), S(cissors), P(aper)g will appear opti-
mal to a randomly selected agent. This is equal to the
probability of obtaining a sample which belongs to the
domain D!. Using our approximate distribution func-
tion, we have
~p![r; s] 
X
(x;y)2D!
f(x; y; rm; sm) := p!(rm; sm): (13)
The probabilities ~p![r; s] are functionals of the weights
fr(u); s(u)ju  tg and we have approximated them with
functions p! of the time averages rm; sm which are them-
selves functionals. Further discussion of this approxima-
tion is given in appendix B 2.
B. Delay equation
During a short nite time interval [t; t+ t], given the
history fr(u); s(u)ju  tg, from the learning rule (5) the
6expected changes in weights will be
E[r] = [pR(rm; sm)  r(t)]t (14)
E[s] = [pS(rm; sm)  s(t)]t: (15)
As L!1, these changes become deterministic and the
weights obey the following coupled delay equations
_r

= pR(rm; sm)  r (16)
_s

= pS(rm; sm)  s: (17)
Solutions to these equations are shown in Figures 2 and 3,
where we see that they accurately capture the simulated
evolution of a system with the same parameter values.
C. Linear Stability Analysis for Symmetric Case
In order to understand the conditions under which sta-
ble oscillations form, we examine the stability of the xed
point of equations (16) and (17). By considering the sys-
tem in the symmetric case where  =  =  = 1, we
can derive analytical results which provide a qualitative
understanding of the system in general.
The xed point of the system in the symmetric case is
(r; s) = ( 13 ;
1
3 ). We rst write the population fractions as
perturbations about this point
r(t) =
1
3
+  r(t) (18)
s(t) =
1
3
+  s(t) (19)
where  r(t) and  s(t) are small uctuations. We then
make use of the fact that as m ! 1, the trinomial
distribution (9) becomes increasingly well approximated
by a bivariate normal distribution [29]. This continu-
ous distribution may be used to obtain (see appendix B 3
for details) the following linearized versions of the delay
equations (16) and (17)
_ r(t)

=
3
4
p
m
Z t
t m
[ r(u) + 2 s(u)] du   r (20)
_ s(t)

=
 3
4
p
m
Z t
t m
[2 r(u) +  s(u)] du   s: (21)
The symmetry of the system suggests we search for oscil-
latory solutions which dier in phase by 2=3. We there-
fore make the anstaz  r(t) = e
t and  s(t) = e
2i
3  r(t),
where  is a complex number. Substitution of these trial
solutions into (20) and (21) yields two identical charac-
teristic equations
2 +   3
p
3i
4
p
m
(1  e m) = 0: (22)
The fact that both characteristic equations are identical
justies our ansatz that pairs of solutions exist which are
identical up to a phase shift. We now write  = x + iy
and introduce the constant
A :=
3
4
r
3

: (23)
The real and imaginary parts of the characteristic equa-
tion may then be written
x2   y2 + x+ Ap
m
e mx sin(my) = 0 (24)
2xy + y   Ap
m
[1  e mx cos(my)] = 0: (25)
For given memory lengthm, provided that  is suciently
small, the real part of the solutions to (24) and (25) will
be negative, so the xed point is stable. As we increase
, then  crosses through the imaginary axis, creating a
switch to instability with oscillations of exponentially in-
creasing magnitude. Although the xed point of the full
dynamics shares this transition to instability, the result-
ing oscillations are bounded, creating a stable limit cycle,
the appearance of which is termed a \Hopf Bifurcation"
[17]. To compute the critical value of the update rate c
we set x = 0 in equation (25) obtaining
1  cos(my)
my
=
1
A
p
m
: (26)
This equation may have multiple roots, corresponding to
dierent frequencies of oscillation. We may determine
the asymptotic behaviour as m ! 1 of the lowest root
be expanding the left hand side to linear order about
y = 0, and then solving for y, obtaining
y  8
3
r

3
m 
3
2 as m!1: (27)
Substitution of this result into (24) again with x = 0
yields
c =
2563=2 csc

8
p

3
3
p
m

81
p
3m5=2
 32
27m2
as m!1: (28)
From this analysis we see that the stability of the xed
point in the symmetric case depends of the value of the
product m2. Our asymptotic expression for y gives us
the period of oscillation at the Hopf bifurcation point
T =
3
4
p
3m3: (29)
We now test these predictions numerically, and explore
the non-symmetric case.
D. Numerical tests of stability
We consider the symmetric case rst, both by numeri-
cally solving equations (16) and (17) where the probabili-
ties pR and pS are as summations (13) over the trinomial
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FIG. 7. Bold line shows r(t) from the numerical solutions to
equations (16) and (17) in the symmetric case when m = 100
and  = 310 4. Thin line show corresponding solution when
 = 510 4. Open circles and black dots show corresponding
simulation results in a system of size L = 1000.
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FIG. 8. Dependence of the steady state standard deviation
 of r(t) on  for m = 20 (lled markers) and m = 80
(open markers). Three dierent combinations of payo values
(; ; ) were used: (1; 1; 1) [circles], (1:5; 2:5; 1) [squares] and
(2; 1; 1) [triangles]. The vertical dotted line has horizontal co-
ordinate 32=27, corresponding to the critical value of m2 in
the symmetric game. L = 100 in all cases.
distribution, and by simulation. We consider the case
m = 100 and in Figure 7 we have plotted r(t) for values
of  lying just above and just below the critical value of
c = 2=16875  3:7  10 4 predicted by our stability
analysis. The appearance of stable oscillations is con-
sistent with our analysis. We also numerically compute
the period of oscillation at the critical point, nding that
T  2347 which compares to our analytical estimate of
T = 740
p
3 = 2302.
We now verify, using simulations, that the appearance
of limit cycles depends on the value of the product m2
in three representative games, each with dierent payos.
For two dierent memory values, m 2 f20; 80g we have
numerically determined the standard deviation of r(t) for
a series of values of . These amplitudes are plotted in
Figure 8 as functions of m2, and we see that the value
m2 eectively predicts the onset of limit cycles at least
at the levels of payo asymmetry we have studied in this
paper. We note however that we have found the precise
critical value of this product only for the symmetric case
in the limit of largem. From Figure 8 we observe that the
asymmetric payos introduce corrections to this critical
value.
V. CONCLUSION
We have studied the rock-scissors-paper game played
by agents with a simple form of memory. This memory is
used by each agent to estimate the current best strategy.
After each new interaction, agents incrementally update
their own strategy, using a form of online learning. The
naive technique for estimating strategy fractions used by
our agents has, in common with ctitious play [8], the un-
derlying assumption of a stationary distribution of agent
strategies in the population. Although this assumption
is clearly false, we have shown that the technique can act
as a more ecient estimator than logit regression.
Provided the system possesses a stable xed point,
agents with longer memories are able to more accurately
determine the true weights, and therefore make better
judgements about which strategy to play. However, ex-
cessively long agent memory produces a transition from
stable equilibrium to a limit cycle. We have shown an-
alytically in the symmetric case that the xed point is
destabilized when m2 reaches a critical value, and that
the period of oscillations at the transition point grows
as m3=2. A simple form of population dynamics, im-
posed on a mixed population of long and short memory
agents demonstrates that the initial advantage aorded
long memory agents is destroyed when they become too
numerous and destabilize the system. Because of this the
Hopf bifurcation point is a stable xed point of the pop-
ulation dynamics, and may therefore be viewed as a self
organized state.
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Appendix A: Logistic regression methodology
The \likelihood" of an agent's memory sample is the
probability that the sample would be obtained, given that
the rock probability weight had the functional form (7).
Letting tik be the time at which agent i experiences his
kth interaction back from the current time, and IR(i; k)
be the indicator function that this interaction is with a
8rock agent, then this likelihood is
Li :=
mY
k=1
r(tik)
IR(i;k)[1  r(tik)]1 IR(i;k): (A1)
To determine the values of 0; 1 which maximize the
likelihood Li we express the log likelihood as a function
of these parameters:
lnLi =
mX
k=1
IR(i; k)[0 + 1tik] (A2)
 
mX
k=1
ln(1 + e0+1tik): (A3)
This expression is then numerically maximized to nd
the most likely values of 0 and 1 which can then be
used in equation (7) to predict the current value of r(t).
Appendix B: Theoretical Details
1. Density of interaction times in agent memory
Considering a single agent, and letting k be the time
elapsed since his kth interaction back from time t, then
his estimate of the current rock weight is
1
m
mX
k=1
r(t  k); (B1)
which is a random variable depending on fkgmk=1. The
time intervals between interactions are exponentially dis-
tributed so the distribution function for k is the Gamma
density
P(k 2 [t; t+ t]) = t
k 1e t
(k   1)!t := k(t)t: (B2)
We dene rm to be the estimated rock weight (B1), av-
eraged over interaction times, so
rm =
mX
k=1
Z 1
0
k(u)
m
r(t  u)du (B3)
=
Z 1
0
 (m;u)
m!
r(t  u)du (B4)
where   is the incomplete gamma function [30]. The
function gm(u) :=  (m;u)=m! is the normalized density
of interaction times in agent memory.
2. Discussion of approximations as m;L!1.
In order to derive an expression for the probability
that an agent will perceive a particular strategy as op-
timal, we approximated the non-stationary distribution
from which agent's memories are drawn with the trino-
mial f(x; y; rm; sm), where f is dened in equation (9).
We briey discuss the quality of this approximation as
m;L ! 1. It is shown in section IVC that the pe-
riod, T , of oscillations at the transition to instability
satises T / m3=2. Therefore the changes in strategy
weights over a typical agent's sample will be O(m 1=2) as
m!1 so the approximation of the sample distribution
with a stationary distribution, becomes increasingly ac-
curate as m becomes large. We noted (section IVA) that
the probability that individual agents perceive a particu-
lar strategy is optimal is a functional of the history of the
weights fr(u); s(u)ju  tg. These weights are stochastic,
with uctuations driven by the noise inherent in agents'
samples. However as L becomes large the interactions of
an individual agent have negligible eect on the weights
r(t); s(t), which become deterministic functions of time
in this limit.
3. Derivation of linearized delay equations
As m!1, the trinomial distribution (9) becomes in-
creasingly well approximated by a bivariate normal dis-
tribution [29] having the same means R = mr; S = ms,
variances 2R = mr(1 r); 2S = ms(1 s) and correlation
 =  (mrs)=(RS). By dening the parameter,
z =
(x  R)2
2R
+
2(x  R)(y   S)
RS
+
(y   S)2
2S
(B5)
we can write this bivariate normal density as:
(x; y)dxdy =
exp
h
  z(x;y)2(1 2)
i
2RS
p
1  2 dxdy: (B6)
We can derive analytical approximations for the proba-
bilities p!(rm; sm), dened in (13) as summations of the
trinomial distribution f(x; y; rm; sm) over domains D!,
by replacing the summation with integrals of the bivari-
ate normal approximation over the same domains. In the
symmetric case this task may be achieved by introducing
new variables [31] (X;Y ), related to (x; y) as follows
x =
m
3
+X   Yp
3
(B7)
y =
m
3
+
2Yp
3
: (B8)
We write the transformed density ~(X;Y ; r; s) so that
(x; y)dxdy = ~(X;Y ; r; s)dXdY . Integrals of the den-
sity over the domains are tractable if the population
fractions are (r; s) = ( 13 ;
1
3 ) so that the peak of the bi-
variate normal coincides with the vertex where the do-
mains meet (see Figure 1), which is also the xed point
of the system in the symmetric case. We can exploit this
tractability by expressing ~(X;Y ; r; s) as a perturbation
of ~(X;Y ; 13 ;
1
3 ). With  r and  s dened as uctuations
9about the symmetric xed point (as in equations (18)
and (19)) we dene the following ratio
h(X;Y ; r;  s) :=
~(X;Y ; 13 +  r;
1
3 +  s)
~(X;Y ; 13 ;
1
3 )
(B9)
which tends to unity as  r;  s ! 0. The rst Taylor
polynomial of h about  r =  s = 0 is
h1(X;Y ; r;  s) = 1 +
6X
 
m p3Y 
m
 r
+
6m
 
X +
p
3Y
  9X2   6p3XY + 9Y 2
2m
 s: (B10)
The density ~(X;Y ; r; s) therefore has the following
asymptotic behaviour, as  s;  r ! 0
~(X;Y ; r; s)  h1(X;Y ; r;  s)3e
  3(X2+Y 2)m
m
: (B11)
We now transform to polar coordinates X = u cos ; Y =
u sin , and make use of the fact that in these coordinates
the domains are symmetrical with angular width 23 . For
example DR = f(u; )j 2 [0; 2=3]g. By integrating over
these domains and dening time averaged uctuations
 r(t) := rm(t)  1
3
=
Z 1
0
gm(u) r(t  u) (B12)
we obtain the following linearized expressions for pR and
pS
pR(rm; sm) =
1
3
+
3(2
p
m  p3)
8
 r +
3
p
m
2
p

 s (B13)
pS(rm; sm) =
1
3
  3
p
m
2
p

 r   3(2
p
m +
p
3)
8
 s:
(B14)
The linearized delay equations (16) and (17) may then
be expressed in terms of the expansion coecients
a(m) :=
3(2
p
m  p3)
8
(B15)
b(m) :=
3
p
m
2
p

(B16)
c(m) :=
3(2
p
m +
p
3)
8
(B17)
as follows
_ r(t)

=
Z 1
0
[a r(t  u) + b s(t  u)] gm(u)du   r
(B18)
_ s(t)

=  
Z 1
0
[b r(t  u) + c s(t  u)] gm(u)du   s
(B19)
As m!1 the weight function gm(u) approaches a step
function
gm(u)!
(
1
m if u 2 [0;m]
0 otherwise
(B20)
and the ratios a(m)2b(m) ;
c(m)
2b(m) ! 1+O(m 1=2) so equations
(B18) and (B19) approach the linearized forms (20) and
(21) analysed in section IVC.
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